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International investment agreements (“IIAs”) provide en-
forceable protections to foreign investors  based on the 
premise that enforceable investor protections will stimu-
late greater foreign investment flows, which, in turn, are 
assumed to promote development. However, as under-
standings of both the effectiveness of these agreements 
as well as the effects of investment and investment gov-
ernance on sustainable development have evolved, it is 
not clear that IIAs, as currently designed, are fit for their 
purpose of promoting development. Worse: they may be 
undermining efforts to achieve the Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals. Change is, therefore, essential. In this note, we 
summarize our proposal that IIAs should be designed and 
evaluated with respect to their ability to:
• Encourage and channel investments that contrib-
ute to sustainable development, and do not support 
harm-causing investments; 
• Foster, and not constrain, responsible, SDG-advancing 
governance at the national level; and 
• Promote international cooperation to overcome 
transnational and collective action challenges related 
to the governance of international investment.
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I. Introduction: The Need for New Thinking on 
International Investment Policy
Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) will re-
quire the tremendous mobilization and re-alignment of public 
and private investment. Indeed, the 2030 Agenda for Sustain-
able Development recognized the need for governments to en-
courage “financial flows, including foreign direct investment, to 
States where the need is greatest,” and to “[a]dopt and imple-
ment investment promotion regimes for least developed coun-
tries.”1  Similarly, it recognizes that not all investment is the same 
and that governments must be able to regulate it to maximize its 
public benefits and minimize those costs.  
Indeed, foreign direct investment (“FDI”) can play an important 
role in achieving the SDGs; FDI can be an efficient and effective 
way to transfer capital and technologies across borders and, 
when the proper policies and conditions are in place, an im-
portant means to spur environmentally sound economic growth 
and development through employment, infrastructure develop-
ment, tax revenues, and other economic linkages and spillovers. 
However, FDI does not automatically generate positive environ-
mental, economic, and social outcomes, and can, at times, harm 
host countries and communities. Even when FDI does generate 
positive outcomes, the price paid to attract FDI (e.g., through 
fiscal or financial incentives, or relaxed or waived social or en-
vironmental regulations) may outweigh the benefits obtained. 
Laws, policies, and practices in host and home countries, and at 
the international level, instrumentally shape both whether FDI 
ultimately contributes to sustainable development and how it 
impacts affected stakeholders and the planet.
At the international level, the network of over 3,000 international 
investment agreements (“IIAs”) comprises a notable and potent 
portion of the relevant governance framework.2   These agree-
ments provide protections and other benefits to foreign inves-
tors, usually enforceable through investor-state dispute settle-
ment (“ISDS”). Support for IIAs is largely based on the premise 
that enforceable investor protections will stimulate greater for-
eign investment flows, which, in turn, are assumed to promote 
development of the treaty parties.3  
However, the veracity of this premise is uncertain at best. First, 
states and other institutions have grown to appreciate that not 
all investments contribute to development and policy interven-
tions are often needed to ensure that the benefits of investment 
are captured and the harms are avoided.4   Second, a growing 
body of research questions whether IIAs actually deliver on their 
stated promise to increase investment flows, never mind at 
what cost, and never mind whether those flows help or hinder 
the host or home countries’ development.5 Third, new research 
alleges that substantive and procedural aspects of investment 
treaties exacerbate inequality,6 undermine the rule of law,7 and 
negatively impact states’ willingness and ability to adopt and 
enforce environmental and public health measures.8  
Informed by this growing body of literature on and experience 
with the costs and benefits of IIAs, various governmental, civ-
il society, and academic stakeholders have begun to discuss 
whether IIAs, as currently designed, implemented, and enforced, 
are the appropriate standards for international economic gover-
nance and, if not, how they should be reformed.9  
The SDGs provide a framework against which today’s analysts 
can evaluate the features and effects of existing IIAs and consid-
er the role such agreements could play. This paper argues that 
existing or re-imagined IIAs should be evaluated with respect to 
their ability to: 
• Encourage and channel investments that contribute to 
sustainable development, and withhold benefits from 
those that do not; 
• Foster, and not constrain, responsible, SDG-advancing 
governance at the national level; and 
• Promote international cooperation to overcome trans-
national and collective action challenges related to the 
governance of international investment.
 
While we affirm the importance of FDI and international invest-
ment governance to achieve the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development, we argue that existing IIAs are not designed to 
promote SDG-enhancing foreign investment nor to facilitate 
strategic international cooperation, and may, in fact, undermine 
development by supporting harmful investments and constrain-
ing governments’ abilities to prevent or address those resulting 
harms.
II. IIAs and SDG-Advancing Investment
 
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development recognizes the 
need to mobilize private investment to address key financing 
gaps in achieving the SDGs. Specifically, the Financing for De-
velopment Action Agenda identifies a need for increased invest-
ment in infrastructure, low carbon and climate resilient devel-
opment, innovation and clean technologies, and sustainable 
agriculture, among other sectors.  Yet, at present, FDI is not be-
ing directed into the locations, sectors, or activities needed to 
maximize impact.   Moreover, FDI is continuing in projects and 
activities that undermine the SDGs, including, but not limited to, 
new fossil fuel exploration and production. The key questions 
this raises are: How can international agreements help to cata-
lyze, attract, and channel SDG-advancing investments? Should 
IIAs withhold benefits from investments that do not advance, 
and potentially undermine, sustainable development? And how 
can and should IIAs identify whether and to what extent invest-
ments are or are not SDG-advancing?
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Catalyzing and Channeling Investment for the SDGs
A number of barriers may affect FDI inflows, including specific 
host country restrictions on foreign investment in particular 
places or sectors; legal, economic, and political environments 
that cause uncertainty and threaten project profitability; infor-
mation asymmetries, linguistic differences, or geographical dis-
tance that make it hard to identify and pursue FDI opportunities; 
and home state measures, like sanctions or tax treatments that 
encourage repatriation over reinvestment of foreign earnings.10 
States seeking to attract investment can, and do, work to ad-
dress some of the policy-related barriers both unilaterally and 
in cooperation with other states. For instance, states address 
these barriers through liberalization of certain sectors, reduc-
ing performance requirements, strengthening certain property 
rights protections, improving the quality and speed of their ad-
ministrative and judicial systems, investing in soft and hard in-
frastructure, and/or offering investment incentives.11 Bilaterally 
and multilaterally, states may also pursue tools and agreements 
related to investor protection, risk mitigation, and economic 
and political cooperation to attract and channel FDI. Interna-
tional instruments can also signal countries’ commitments to 
offer certain standards of treatment or abide by certain norms; 
and they can include a range of mechanisms, including state-
to-state peer review, informal consultations, and legalized dis-
pute settlement, to ensure that signals align with practice and 
to monitor and strengthen adherence to commitments. Each of 
these options varies in terms of its overall effectiveness as well 
as its costs and benefits to investors, governments, and other 
stakeholders, with those costs and benefits often depending a 
great deal on specific context.
International Investment Agreements (IIAs) have largely focused 
on achieving their promotion function by locking in, at the inter-
national level, state promises to protect foreign investors from 
harms or losses suffered as a result of state conduct and have of-
ten coupled those protections with investor-state dispute settle-
ment (ISDS) mechanisms that allow foreign investors to directly 
claim and seek remedy for breach.12 Proponents of IIAs have 
contended that these investment protections can catalyze inter-
national investment flows.13 But, although investment treaties 
might indeed affect how a company structures its investment 
in a host state (e.g., encouraging investors to route their invest-
ments through an intermediary state that has a strong invest-
ment treaty with the host state),14 there is no clear or consistent 
evidence that the thousands of existing treaties have had any 
significant effect on investors’ decisions regarding whether and 
how much to invest in particular host destinations or, therefore, 
on catalyzing international investment and its anticipated ben-
efits.15 
However, IIAs could employ different strategies. Rather than im-
posing obligations on host governments regarding treatment 
of investments, investment treaties could address investment 
governance more holistically, help to identify and overcome 
specific barriers to investment, and include mechanisms and 
commitments on the part of the home state to actively promote 
increased cross-border investment flows, particularly in sectors 
and activities consistent with the states’ development objec-
tives. 
Indeed, some treaties are already starting to do this.16 The Ja-
pan-Mexico Economic Partnership Agreement, for instance, ex-
plicitly includes state commitments to promote cross-border 
investment in activities designed to advance sustainable devel-
opment and combat climate change through capacity and insti-
tutional building and informational exchange, including for the 
“identification of investment opportunities and the promotion 
and development of business alliances in the field of environ-
ment.”17 The Cotonou Agreement, concluded between the EU 
and the members of the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (“ACP”) 
Group of States in 2000, and subsequently amended, provides 
for inter-state cooperation and European Union (“EU”) assis-
tance in a range of activities that aim to increase cross-border 
investment flows, including capacity building for investment 
promotion agencies, dissemination of information regarding 
business opportunities in ACP states, provision of risk capital 
and investment guarantees, and assistance in developing rele-
vant technical, managerial, and professional expertise.18
Brazil’s Cooperation and Facilitation Investment Agreements,19 
seek to advance investment promotion objectives by, for in-
stance, establishing ombudsmen or “Focal Points” responsible 
for providing support to investors from the other contracting 
party.20 The ombudsmen, or Focal Point’s, duties include provid-
ing “timely and useful information on regulatory issues on gen-
eral investment or on special projects,” fielding complaints from 
investors, and preventing potential conflicts.21 
The examples of investment-related treaty provisions referred 
to above are arguably modest in terms of their focus on and 
commitments to advancing investment flows for sustainable 
development; nevertheless, they begin to highlight possibilities 
for investment treaties, if re-oriented, to more actively mobi-
lize and shape investment for sustainable development. One 
could imagine more robust provisions included in IIAs such as 
commitments to increase investment into the less developed 
country partner or into particular sectors or activities as well as 
mechanisms to routinely evaluate among the treaty partners 
whether the provisions of the treaty are meeting their intentions 
to promote SDG-aligned investment. 
Not Subsidizing Harmful Investments
In addition to more proactively promoting investments that con-
tribute to the SDGs, so too should IIAs discourage—or at least 
not offer additional protections or support to—investments 
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with clearly negative effects. Such investments may include, for 
example, investments in fossil fuel extraction and related infra-
structure, investments that result from or perpetuate corrupt 
dealings, or investments violating international labor standards. 
Both the substantive benefits and protections as well as the pro-
cedural privileges offered in investment treaties, as they have 
been negotiated, interpreted, and applied to date, are addi-
tional to and go further than protections offered by analogous 
areas of domestic and international law.22   These benefits act 
as regulatory incentives that, even if not effective at attracting 
investment, effectively subsidize foreign investments. Framed in 
this manner, it is uncontroversial to suggest that governments 
should evaluate which types of investments, investors and ac-
tivities are deserving of such subsidies and ensure that the pro-
tections and benefits afforded under IIAs do not support invest-
ments that may undermine the SDGs.23
Governments, for instance, could ensure that treaty benefits do 
not cover:
• Investments for trade in or production of goods or 
services illegal in the host state,24 or investments that 
would significantly and irreversibly harm natural eco-
systems, require resettlement of large numbers of peo-
ple,25 or otherwise impact critical ecological zones;26 
• Foreign investments made solely for the purpose of 
avoiding taxes otherwise due to the home country, 
such as “inversions,” in which companies move over-
seas to reduce their tax burden;27 or
• Investment in exploration for and extraction of new fos-
sil fuel reserves, projects that result in major deforesta-
tion harmful to biodiversity, and production and trade 
of harmful products for consumption in third countries, 
among others.
Governments risk reputational and potentially legal conse-
quences for affirmatively supporting outward investments 
that harm home28 and host countries and communities,29 third 
countries, and the global commons. Home governments are in-
creasingly assessing and addressing conduct and impacts of the 
firms they support overseas30; Canada, for instance, has indicat-
ed that it may withdraw or deny trade advocacy support and/
or financial assistance to companies that do not adhere to the 
government’s environmental and social policies in their over-
seas activities 31 and that do not comply in good faith with dis-
pute resolution mechanisms instituted to ensure the companies 
adhere to standards of responsible business conduct.32 Gov-
ernment-sponsored political risk and export credit insurance 
schemes also often incorporate relatively robust ex ante screens 
and ex post exclusions designed to help ensure that beneficia-
ries do not have deleterious social, environmental, and human 
rights impacts in host countries33 and that projects contribute to 
development, through job creation, training, private sector de-
velopment, and technology and knowledge transfer.34
Governments wanting to ensure that their IIAs do not subsidize 
or support harm-causing activities could exclude certain invest-
ments or types of investments from coverage, or from certain 
treaty protections or benefits. Exclusions could be categorical, 
based on the type of investment or investor activity, or could 
be based on subjective assessments of investments’ alignment 
with the SDGs. In addition to categorical exclusions, IIAs could 
also require that investments, in order to be covered, must be 
“responsible”35, “comply with the law of the host state”36 or the 
home state37 during the duration of the investment, and make a 
contribution to the host state’s economic development. While 
treaties could usefully exclude harmful investors or investments 
from treaty coverage, treaties should at very least limit access to 
ISDS and associated remedies for such investors or investments, 
even if the protections broadly remain.
III. IIAs and SDG-Advancing Governance
The positive or negative impacts of an investment project are 
not necessarily inherent to the project, allowing for the specif-
ic inclusions or exclusions described above, but often depend 
to a significant degree on the specific corporate policies and 
practices as informed, regulated, and enforced by relevant do-
mestic and international governance frameworks. Given the 
importance of governance to investment outcomes, and the in-
trinsic importance of justice, rule of law, and strong institutions 
(as reflected in SDG 16), it is crucial to consider how IIAs affect 
these instrumental and normative aspects of governance. How 
do IIAs affect the way in which governments govern investments 
and try to influence their economic, social, and environmental 
outcomes? 
Supporting Fair and Inclusive Policy-Making Processes
IIAs are often cited as tools that can be used to improve the rule 
of law and good governance by holding governments account-
able for abuses of authority.38 Yet, while in theory this might be 
plausible,39 evidence of any improvement remains lacking.40 In-
deed, studies have found that BITs and ISDS claims may have 
negative effects on the rule of law.41 
First, allowing foreign investors to circumvent domestic legal 
systems to pursue claims in international arbitration can under-
mine the role and perceived authority and legitimacy of domes-
tic institutions. Investment treaties could, but currently do not, 
contain provisions or mechanisms to build capacity of and trust 
in courts or administrative bodies to better ensure that investors 
(both foreign and domestic) have access to fair, effective, and 
efficient legal systems. The approach taken in IIAs contrasts with 
the approach taken in international human rights law. Under 
IIAs, investors can use ISDS to bypass domestic courts. In human 
rights law, individuals (and sometimes corporate entities) can 
also bring claims against governments, but its supra-nation-
al mechanisms are designed to be instruments for advancing 
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domestic reforms, and recognize the crucial role of domestic 
systems as the main targets for and implementers of those re-
forms.42 
Second, ISDS undermines principles of equality before the law 
where covered investors have, through substantive protections 
enforceable through ISDS, (1) greater power relative to both the 
host state government and other private parties; and (2) great-
er substantive standards of protection, strengthening the legal 
force of their economic rights and “expectations” to the potential 
detriment of competing rights and interests.43 These inequalities 
provided under the law can entrench and exacerbate inequali-
ties in economic, social, and political terms. The Fair and Equi-
table Treatment (“FET”) standard, for instance, which has been 
used to enforce protections of investors’ legitimate expectations 
and favors stability over change, stands to significantly constrain 
states’ abilities to adapt policy frameworks to fight inequality. 
Investors have also used ISDS to challenge the attempts of tradi-
tionally marginalized voices to assert legal and political power.44 
When there is a contest among levels or branches of government 
(local vs. central, mining ministry vs. environmental ministry, or 
executive vs. judiciary) about whether to approve and how to 
govern a project, IIA protections and privileges can potentially 
influence the outcomes in pro-investor directions. Moreover, in-
dividuals and communities affected by the relevant investment 
have no legal right to participate in or shape ISDS proceedings 
(or, indeed, even follow the developments of certain proceed-
ings), leading arbitrators to base their decisions on a narrow and 
incomplete view of the law and facts and to produce decisions 
that shape the law so as to be disproportionately attentive to 
only investors’ economic interests.45 
Third, the issues outlined above are compounded by investment 
treaties’ express and implied notice-and-comment rules, requir-
ing governments to publish advance notice of proposed actions 
and to respond to questions and comments received from for-
eign investors and other constituents.46 These requirements 
have been interpreted as forming part of the FET obligation.47 
While these obligations may be expected to advance the rule of 
law and improve government transparency, accountability, and 
decision-making, they risk providing undue space for non-agen-
cy actors, including foreign investors, to determine the shape 
and fate of proposed regulatory actions through submission of 
public comments, private communications, and/or other lobby-
ing activities. An investor can raise the threat of investor-state 
arbitration (and the often high legal fees, expenses, liability, and 
reputational risks associated with it) in challenges to proposed 
agency actions and processes of rule-formulation, potentially 
influencing the outcomes of rule-making processes in ways that 
administrative notice-and-comment mechanisms do not.48 
Public engagement on policy making can ensure a range of per-
spectives are heard and considered. However, with unequal re-
sources, access, and interests and unclear rules regarding who 
can provide input, as well as when and how to provide that 
input, participatory processes can be captured or heavily influ-
enced by certain more powerful economic interests.49 Requiring 
states to listen to investors’ concerns, without ensuring that oth-
er stakeholders are similarly able to participate and entitled to 
be heard, risks exacerbating and entrenching undue corporate 
influence over the law. To the extent that cooperation with and 
input from non-governmental stakeholders is considered useful 
for promoting open governance, careful consideration is ad-
vised as to the right instrument or modalities to support such 
cooperation and how open, participatory processes can best 
avoid agency capture by special interests. 
IIAs could avoid these issues and be designed to make posi-
tive contributions to SDG 16. They could, for instance, integrate 
mechanisms to identify and address challenges faced both by 
investors and, crucially, by other stakeholders relating to gov-
ernance of investments.50 Treaty parties could also commit 
to improving the capability of governments to manage robust 
multi-stakeholder impact assessment processes, which can be 
crucial for ensuring the long-term sustainability and even basic 
financial viability of major investment projects.51 To the extent 
that investor concerns relate to unduly slow administrative or 
judicial proceedings, parties could cooperate to identify bottle-
necks and provide resources to ensure that investors – and all 
other stakeholders – have access to fair, inclusive, effective, and 
efficient legal systems for resolving investment-related disputes, 
rather than supporting foreign investors to bypass domestic in-
stitutions and processes.52
Protecting Appropriate Policy Space to Regulate In-
vestments 
In addition to these institutional concerns about voice, access, 
representation, and power in policy-making processes, IIAs’ sub-
stantive and procedural investment protections hinder govern-
ments’ willingness and abilities to implement and enforce pol-
icies to ensure that covered investments generate benefits, not 
harms, in the state parties. As explained above, whether FDI con-
tributes to sustainable development depends on the ability of 
governments to adopt and enforce public interest regulations. 
For that reason, it is essential that states evaluate the effects of 
IIAs on their ability to regulate in the public interest. 
Governments need policy space to be able to enact, implement, 
revise, and refine their policies, laws, and regulations in order 
to achieve sustainable development objectives. While inter-
national law, to some degree, inherently constrains domestic 
policy space,53 it is important to consider carefully when, why, 
and how international law should do so. For instance, inter-
national economic law can help restrain individual countries’ 
beggar-thy-neighbor impulses and prisoners’ dilemmas and 
enable governments to withstand pressure from powerful do-
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mestic special interest groups to impose protectionist measures 
that would benefit those special interests at the expense of the 
broader public. 
However, empowering international economic law to interfere 
in sensitive, complex, and context-specific decisions made at 
the domestic level regarding public interests and government 
duties raises important concerns, including whether economic 
interests and concepts like “efficiency” would be prioritized at 
the expense of other interests and values not so readily mone-
tized. 
This background helps illustrate why IIAs generate unease. 
While IIAs in theory discipline protectionist conduct, investors 
are not bringing cases that allege discrimination on the basis 
of their foreign nationality.54 Rather, investors are using IIAs to 
impose obligations that are much more expansive in reach and 
open-ended in content than anti-protectionist rules, allowing 
for international scrutiny of domestic law, policy, action, and 
inaction, irrespective of the purpose of the challenged conduct. 
Governments can be, and have been, held liable even for good 
faith conduct intended to address and improve social, environ-
mental, and economic conditions when the government’s con-
duct intentionally or unintentionally interferes with the rights or 
expectations of covered foreign investors. The public interest 
aim or intent of the measure is not a bar to claims or a defense 
to liability.55 
Because of the relatively vague nature of many investment trea-
ty obligations, at least some of the concern about the impact of 
investment treaties is not based on the fact that they will result 
in claims and/or liability for states, but that there is a risk that 
they will; and that risk may cause governments to abandon or 
weaken otherwise legitimate public interest measures, particu-
larly, but not only, in developing countries. 
In order to ensure that IIAs do not frustrate states’ efforts to de-
velop and implement laws and policies in the public interest, it 
is important to carefully shape their substantive obligations ac-
cordingly and ensure that the treaty’s dispute settlement provi-
sions are consistent with accepted rule of law principles of trans-
parency, certainty, and accountability. 
IV. IIAs and SDG-Advancing International Coop-
eration 
In addition to their role in attracting and channeling sustainable 
development-driving investments and promoting good gover-
nance domestically, IIAs could help to address challenges of in-
vestment governance that may be exacerbated by global corpo-
rate actors and their activities and by collective action problems. 
Combatting Races to the Bottom
Through their liberalization and free-transfer provisions, IIAs 
make it easier for companies not only to expand but also to 
move their existing investments across borders. But, the agree-
ments miss a crucial opportunity to combat the costly and often 
wasteful beggar-thy-neighbor incentive schemes that may result 
which can erode the benefits FDI otherwise might offer. A limit-
ed number of IIAs include provisions restricting certain types of 
regulatory incentives in order to prevent governments from cre-
ating races to the bottom by waiving or derogating from existing 
labor or environmental standards to attract investment. How-
ever, these provisions are rarely, if ever, enforced. Treaty parties 
could extend non-derogation provisions to other areas like cor-
ruption, public health, and human rights; follow the small num-
ber of recent IIAs that commit treaty partners to advance labor 
standards, human rights, and environmental protection in line 
with specified international standards; or require companies to 
meet certain production process standards in order to qualify 
for duty-free treatment. 
Closing Transnational Governance Gaps
Although complex global corporate legal structures can drive up 
returns to shareholders and strengthen MNEs’ competitive po-
sitions, they often do so at the expense of others, eroding tax 
bases, externalizing harms without compensating for losses 
caused, and unfairly tilting the playing field. Rules on corporate 
form and jurisdictional boundaries significantly limit the ability 
of governments and the public to access information about a 
given company, subject the company to investigation, hold the 
company liable, and/or collect any damages awarded.
Governments have unilaterally and collectively taken some 
steps to address these issues. Courts in a few domestic jurisdic-
tions, for instance, have been somewhat softening the arguably 
artificial lines between corporate affiliates, limiting the ability 
of parent companies to avoid liability for harms caused by their 
subsidiaries.56 At the multilateral level, governments have been 
committing to increase cross-border information-sharing and 
collaboration on taxation of MNEs and have been working to-
gether to help understand competition effects of cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions, enforce their anti-trust laws, and pre-
vent abusive market practices.57
But much remains to be done. IIAs aiming to increase MNE ac-
tivities should play a role, helping to anticipate and monitor the 
governance gaps that MNEs fall into, or purposefully exploit, and 
supporting collaboration to close those gaps58 or remedy their 
effects.59 Relevant activities can include technical and financial 
support,60 agreements to cooperate on rule-making, monitoring 
and enforcement relating to international corporate activities, 
and efforts to establish funds and mechanisms to ensure access 
to the appropriate remedies.61 
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Anticipating, Understanding, and Addressing Treaty 
Effects in State Parties 
Given the intention for these treaties to effect changes in invest-
ment flows and practices, states should assess the projected 
environmental, social, economic, and human rights impacts of 
investment agreements and the FDI they support and evaluate 
the factors that make those impacts more or less likely to occur. 
A robust ex ante impact assessment and effective implementa-
tion plan could map relevant environmental, health, and safety 
standards in the treaty partners and include relevant mecha-
nisms and institutions for ongoing monitoring, evaluation, and 
action. Implementation plans could include commitments, for 
instance, to support treaty partners in the development and 
enforcement of relevant standards, including through capaci-
ty-building; to support investors, including small and medium 
sized enterprises, to adopt best practices in their foreign invest-
ments; to share information regarding corporate violators; to 
develop complaint mechanisms where employees and citizens 
could report violations against firms irrespective of ownership; 
and to monitor changes in the industry and its performance on 
environmental, health, and safety issues. 
Some guidance and precedent exist. The SDGs provide a use-
ful set of issues, targets, and indicators to incorporate into more 
robust assessments and action plans. Some governments have 
domestic requirements for ex ante reviews of treaties’ impacts 
on sustainable development outcomes; and some governments 
also have internal processes for ex post assessment of the agree-
ments’ effects. Similarly, some treaties have mechanisms for 
ongoing review and implementation of their social and environ-
mental provisions. 
These domestic and treaty-based processes and mechanisms 
have been criticized, however. Ex ante assessments have been 
seen as tools for promoting negotiations and conclusions of 
treaties, rather than critically reviewing the potential agreements 
and their potential content.62 Additionally, ex post assessments 
have found that, in practice, provisions and institutions aimed at 
promoting sustainable development, and avoiding harms, have 
not been effectively implemented.63 Yet overall, these findings 
help illuminate the myriad ways in which treaties can, and do, 
affect environmental, social, and economic outcomes and offer 
lessons about what can, and should, be done in the future to 
improve them. 
Addressing Relevant Global Commons Challenges
IIAs could also be mobilized to tackle global commons chal-
lenges, in which individual states have incentives to consume 
rivalrous and non-excludable common goods unsustainably. 
International cooperation, including cooperation relating to 
economic policy, is necessary in these arenas to promote more 
sustainable production and consumption to the benefit of all 
countries. 
Climate change is likely the most pressing and prototypical, 
though surely not the only, commons problem faced today. 
Apart from ensuring that IIA disciplines do not unduly constrain 
climate policies, IIAs could impose affirmative obligations to: 
cooperate on identifying opportunities for investment in clean 
technologies; provide, on a special and differential treatment 
basis, support for qualifying projects; reinforce or integrate com-
mitments under climate change agreements; and mandate cor-
porate disclosures of GHGs, including GHGs from outward FDI. 
Similarly, rather than including provisions that constrain govern-
ment policies regarding technology transfer, IIAs could instead 
include language to support technology transfer, including the 
commitments made in the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights.
V. Conclusion
Revisiting IIA design in light of the SDGs requires a thorough 
evaluation and retooling of investment governance, with coun-
tries conducting robust assessments of the domestic and inter-
national objectives and impacts of investment treaties, and tak-
ing relevant steps to bring treaties more in line with 21st Century 
goals. This is ever more important in light of the real need for 
international cooperation and coordination to address a num-
ber of challenges in our increasingly globalized world, especially 
considering the potential for international investment gover-
nance to play a role in addressing them.
Aligning existing treaties with the SDGs raises different oppor-
tunities and challenges than designing future treaties. For new 
treaties, countries have the freedom to craft new provisions, 
exclude more traditional clauses, and narrow or exclude ISDS. 
Bringing old treaties in line with current priorities, in contrast, 
can require termination, renegotiation, and/or interpretive clar-
ification through exchange of diplomatic notes or other chan-
nels. Although addressing both existing and future treaties in-
creases the complexity of a government’s task, policy coherence 
and effectiveness require a backward look at the large stock of 
treaties already in force and a forward look at the agreements 
that may be concluded in the future.
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